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
**CHALLENGES WITHOUT A REAL  
EXTERNAL POLICY. HEALTH,  
DEMOGRAPHY / ПРОБЛЕМИ ПОЗА  
РЕАЛЬНОЮ ЗОВНІШНЬОЮ  
ПОЛІТИКОЮ. ОХОРОНА ЗДОРОВ'Я,  
ДЕМОГРАФІЯ**

**JEAN MONNET MODULE**

**2018 - 2021**

**600222-EPP-1-2018-1-UA-  
EPPJMO-MODULE**

Figure 1 – Changes in the EU-27 and the global population (%; 1960=100 %)



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# A STRONGLY AGEING POPULATION

## Median age

Age that divides the population in two parts of equal size, that is, there are as many persons with ages above the median as there are with ages below the median.

Source: [The Global Health Observatory](#), WHO.



# A STRONGLY AGEING POPULATION

The median age in the EU-27 is projected to increase by 4.5 years between 2019 and 2050, and reach 48.2 years at the end of that period.

Eurostat projects that Italy will be the first to reach a median age of 50, in 2030, followed by Portugal in 2035 and Greece in 2036.

In 2050, Italy is projected to have the oldest median age in the EU-27 at 51.6 years, followed by Portugal at 51.2 years.

In 2070, Poland and Italy are expected to have the highest median ages from among the EU countries, at 52.6 years and 52.1 years, respectively.



Figure 2 – EU-27 population pyramids for 2001 and 2019 (number of women and men by age group)





Figure 3 – Population pyramids for the EU-27 (number of women and men by age group), 2020 and 2050



# A SHRINKING WORKING-AGE POPULATION

## Age dependency ratio

The **total-age dependency ratio** relates the number of individuals – the young and the elderly – who are likely to be 'dependent' on the support of others, to the number of working-age individuals who are capable of providing this support. It is calculated on the basis of two ratios, the **young-age dependency ratio** and the **old-age dependency ratio**, which compare i) the number of those aged 0-14 to the number of those aged 15-64, and ii) the number of those aged 65 and over to the number of those aged 15-64.

Source: [Eurostat](#).



# A SHRINKING WORKING-AGE POPULATION

The total-age dependency ratio for the EU-27 was 54.9 % in 2019, meaning that there were around two people of working age (15-64) for every younger or older person likely to be dependent on them (i.e. aged 0-14 or 65 and over).

Breaking this down, the old-age dependency ratio (those 65 and over compared to those 15-64) was 31.4 %, so there were roughly three people aged 15-64 for each person aged 65 or over.

The young-age dependency ratio (those aged 0-14 compared to those 15-64) was 23.3 %, meaning that there were roughly four people of working age for each person aged 0-14.

Compared to values in 2001 (total dependency ratio of 48.3 %, old-age dependency ratio of 23.4 %, young-age dependency ratio of 24.9 %) a large increase (6.6 %) of the age dependency ratio could be observed, which is essentially due to an increasing old-age dependency ratio (by 8 %), rather than to the young-age dependency ratio, which diminished by 1.6 %.





# A SHRINKING WORKING-AGE POPULATION

According to projections, the total-age dependency ratio will accelerate intensely, reaching 61.8 % in 2030 and 76.1 % in 2050 before slowing down but still increasing, and reaching beyond 80 % (projection 80.8 %) in 2080.

At these levels, there would only be around five people of working age (15-64) for every four people older or younger than this age band in 2080.

This would have serious implications for a range of areas, including economic growth, fiscal sustainability, healthcare and long-term care, wellbeing and social cohesion, especially since the main driver of this increase is the old-age dependency ratio, projected to reach 39.1 % in 2030 and 52.0 % in 2050.

This means that by 2050, there will be fewer than two people of working age (15-64) for every person aged 65 or over, twice fewer than in 2001, when there were about four working-age persons for every person aged 65 or over.

In contrast, the young-age dependency ratio is projected to first decrease to 22.7 % in 2030, and then to slowly increase to 24.2 % in 2050 and 25.1 % in 2080.



# INCREASING LIFE EXPECTANCY

## Life expectancy


**Life expectancy** is the number of years persons of different ages may expect to live, starting from age zero.

**Life expectancy at birth** is the mean number of years a new-born child can be expected to live if subjected throughout his or her life to the current mortality conditions, that is, the probabilities of dying at each age. Any later age can also be chosen as a starting point; the **total expected life span** is then this age, plus the life expectancy at that age.

Source: [Eurostat](#).



Figure 4 – Life expectancy at birth in the EU-27, 2002-2018



# LOW FERTILITY RATES


## Fertility rate

The **total fertility rate** is defined as the mean number of children who would be born to a woman during her lifetime, if she were to spend her childbearing years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates that have been measured in a given year.


Source: [Eurostat](#).



Figure 5 – Total fertility rate (births per woman)



Map 1 – Total fertility rates in the EU-27 by Member State



# LOW FERTILITY RATES

In terms of the number of live births, during the 1961-2019 period, the highest annual total in the EU-27 was recorded in 1964, at 6.79 million.

With 4.65 million deaths in the EU-27 in 2019, this meant a reduction in the natural population of the EU-27 by half a million people that year.

By contrast, there were 4.15 million live births in 2019 – fewer than two-thirds of the 1964 peak – despite the EU-27 population having grown in the meantime by around one quarter, from 367.35 million people in 1964 to 447.7 million people in 2020.



# POLICY RESPONSES TO DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS

the drivers of demographic change in Europe (longer life expectancy; fewer births; an ageing population; smaller households; a more mobile Europe; a changing population size);

the impact of demographic change on the EU social market economy (skills and education issues; a larger and more inclusive labour market; healthcare and long-term care; public budgets; the regional and the local dimension; life quality and access to services);

the twin transitions (environmental and digital) and demographic change;

geopolitical questions; Europe in the world.





# POLICY RESPONSES TO DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS

a shrinking working-age population;

the need for higher age-related public spending;

a rapid population change in certain regions necessitating new solutions;

the impact of demographic change on Europe's position in the world;

the interactions between demographic change and the green and digital transitions.



# POLICY RESPONSES TO DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS

The green paper on ageing, adopted on 27 January 2021, is the first outcome of this report and launches a debate on one of the defining demographic transformations in Europe.

The paper highlights the importance of healthy and active ageing and lifelong learning as the two concepts that can enable a thriving ageing society.

Active ageing necessitates promoting healthy lifestyles throughout our lives, including consumption and nutrition patterns, as well as encouraging physical and social activity.

The task of bringing more people in the 55-64 age group to the labour market might be accomplished by postponing retirements, improving working conditions for older workers (for instance, through better digital connectivity), or giving subsidies to companies hiring older workers and encouraging senior entrepreneurship.

The paper also emphasises the importance of improving wellbeing through intergenerational solidarity.



# THE IMPLICATIONS OF COVID-19 ON DEMOGRAPHY

According to Eurostat statistics, around 297 500 more people died in the EU between March and October 2020, compared with the same period in the previous years, with a peak in April 2020 (25 % more deaths than during the same month of the previous year).

The Member States with the highest values of excess mortality<sup>33</sup> were Spain (78.9 %), Belgium (73.9%) and the Netherlands (53.6 %).

Another peak in mortality started in August–September with the second wave of the pandemic (excess mortality in the EU reached the following figures above the average: 8 % in September and 17 % in October).

The indicator climbed even higher in November 2020 in all EU Member States that had available data.

The Member States that had the highest values this time around were Poland (97.2 %), Bulgaria (94.5 %) and Slovenia (91.4 %), all three having showed a much flatter curve during spring.

The global EU average for November 2020 however remained lower than for April 2020.



# THE IMPLICATIONS OF COVID-19 ON DEMOGRAPHY

According to Eurostat statistics and the Commission's employment and social developments quarterly review, the coronavirus pandemic and the related confinement measures accounted for a drop in the EU employment rate from 73.1 % in 2019 to 72 % in the second quarter of 2020, the steepest since 2000.

Young people were the worst affected: their employment rates dropped from 33.3 % to 31.2 % during the same period.

A Joint Research Centre policy brief<sup>35</sup> highlights that in almost all EU countries, women and young workers were and are more represented in the forcefully closed sectors, which reinforces the tendency of postponing childbirth.



# THE PROBLEM OF POVERTY

- **Absolute or extreme poverty** exists when people lack the basic needs for subsistence. For example, they may be starving, lacking drinking water, adequate housing or sufficient clothing or medicines, and struggling to stay alive. This situation is more common in developing countries, even though there are some people living in the EU who are constantly at risk of extreme poverty;
- **Relative poverty** is present when people's way of life and income are worse than the general living standards in the place where they live and where they attempt to participate in ordinary economic, social and cultural activities. Relative poverty therefore depends on the living standards in the society where an individual lives.




# THE PROBLEM OF POVERTY

“People are said to be living in poverty if their income and resources are so inadequate as to preclude them from having a standard of living considered acceptable in the society in which they live. Because of their poverty they may experience multiple disadvantage through unemployment, low income, poor housing, inadequate health care and barriers to lifelong learning, culture, sport and recreation. They are often excluded and marginalised from participating in activities (economic, social and cultural) that are the norm for other people and their access to fundamental rights may be restricted”.







Figure 6 – Fertility versus GDP per capita



Income category





● high ● upper middle ● lower middle ● low





Income category

● high ● upper middle ● lower middle ● low



# POVERTY AND AGE-RELATED DIFFERENCES

According to the United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef), more than 700 million people in the world still live in extreme poverty, defined as surviving on less than US\$1.90 a day; children make up more than half of these (356 million), even though they account for only one third of the global population.

Over half of the world's children living in extreme poverty are in sub-Saharan Africa and almost 36 % in South Asia.

In countries affected by conflict and fragility, more than half of children live in extremely poor households. Children are the worst affected across all poverty lines, including that of moderate poverty.



Figure 7 – Age-related relative poverty in OECD countries and G20 countries

Risk of poverty rates (last year available)



Child poverty significantly affects the two most populous G20 countries, India and China, although the picture varies depending on whether relative or absolute poverty is being considered. Based on the latter indicator, India stands out with its high share of children living in extreme poverty, at over 26.8 % (representing over 30 % of all extremely poor children in the world<sup>60</sup>). In China, this share stands at 16.7 %. China is also the G20 country with the highest rate of relative poverty among children, according to OECD data.




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Figure 7 – Age-related relative poverty in OECD countries and G20 countries

Risk of poverty rates (last year available)

Total Children (under 18) Elderly (over 65) Members of the G20



With regard to poverty among the elderly, OECD data for the same period reveal that relative poverty rates of people aged over 65 were very high in the G20 countries South Korea (44 %), China (39 %) and Mexico (25 %). Best performing among the OECD and the G20 countries are several EU Member States – Denmark, France, Hungary, the Netherlands and Slovakia – with the lowest relative poverty rates, between 3 % and 5 %.



# EU POLICIES FOR ERADICATING AGE-RELATED POVERTY IN THE WORLD

Ending poverty in all its forms everywhere is the first of the 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) in the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

Together with its Member States, the EU has been the biggest contributor (with €475 million for 2014- 2020) to the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), which supports basic education in the poorest countries.

The new EU gender action plan (GAP III) 2021-2025, which defines the EU's overarching gender priorities in external relations, highlights the need to promote sexual and reproductive health and rights also in order to guarantee access to education for girls.



# INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION TO THE EU AND THE LINK TO POVERTY

Research estimates show that the net population growth resulting from international migration in the half century from 1960 to 2009 in EU-27 countries (without Croatia) was nearly 26 million people, of whom 57 % arrived after the year 2000.

The scale of global migration is still on the rise, as evidenced by the latest available data from the International Labour Organization's December 2018 report, Considering the ageing EU population and assuming that fertility rates in the Member States would remain relatively low, the population growth or decline in the EU is expected to heavily depend on net migration from third countries. revealing an approximately 11 % increase in the global number of migrant workers (from 150 million to 164 million) between 2013 and 2017.

The effects are perceptible even now, as, for example, the overall positive population growth in 2020 for the EU as a whole was due to net positive migration, given that the natural population change (more deaths than births registered) was negative.



# AGE-RELATED TENDENCIES IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION TO THE EU

Regarding general age-related tendencies in international migration, data show that some 74 % of migrants worldwide are in the working-age group (20-64 years), and that 58.1 % of them reside in the developed global North (i.e. in Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan).

This is true for some 80 % of immigrants in the OECD and the EU compared to native-born people (66 % of the native-born population), particularly in the 25-44 age group.

In terms of age, data on the demographic structure of the EU-27 indicate that in 2018, immigrants were generally younger than the total population of the country of destination, having a median age of 29.2 years compared to the median age of the total EU-27 population (43.7 years).



# INTERNAL EU MIGRATION AND THE LINK TO POVERTY

Unlike the international migration of third-country citizens to the EU, internal migration of EU citizens is based on the right of free labour mobility as one of the fundamental freedoms of the EU.

In geographical terms, this has involved mostly migration from central and eastern European Member States after their accession to the EU in respectively 2004 and 2007, to western European ones, and, since 2013, from southern Member States to northern ones.

However, despite the fact that migration flows are very closely related to labour migration influenced by better labour market opportunities in key destination countries, these flows are not only seen as a one-way movement.

Even in the case of continuing migration flows, sending countries would still benefit from the exit of the brightest, as this creates incentives for them to invest more in human capital or gain through positive diaspora externalities on foreign direct investment.





# AGE-RELATED TENDENCIES IN INTERNAL EU MIGRATION


Research reveals that more than three-quarters of EU citizens residing in another EU country in 2012 were of working age (20-64 years).

Specifically, surveys from 2013 showed that the typical EU internal migrants were most often highly educated men between 25 and 39 years of age, mostly because language proficiency and family ties were reported as the main barriers to mobility for those who had not lived abroad.

Other studies cite surveys confirming this tendency and point to the lower likelihood of intra-EU labour migration for persons in the 40-54 age group (9 %) and those older than 55 (7 %), compared to the 25-39 age group (12 %).

A similar tendency also applies to intentions to migrate for work to another Member State, which seem to decrease with age (56 % for persons in the 15-24 age group, 36 % for those in the 25-39 age group, 23 % for the 40-54 age group and 5 % for those above 55).





<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pek2iM4Kbno>

Jean Monnet Module 'The Foreign Policy of the European Union'



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# DEMOGRAPHY



**ДЯКУЮ ЗА УВАГУ!**

